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Article
Introduction
The relationship between population growth and growth of 
economic output has been studied extensively (Heady & 
Hodge, 2009). Many analysts believe that economic growth 
in high-income countries is likely to be relatively slow in 
coming years in part because population growth in these 
countries is predicted to slow considerably (Baker, Delong, 
& Krugman, 2005). Others argue that population growth has 
been and will continue to be problematic as more people 
inevitably use more of the finite resources available on earth, 
thereby reducing long-term potential growth (Linden, 2017). 
Population growth affects many phenomena such as the age 
structure of a country’s population, international migration, 
economic inequality, and the size of a country’s work force. 
These factors both affect and are affected by overall eco-
nomic growth. The purpose of this article is to use long-term 
historical data and a review of both theoretical and empirical 
work on the relationship among growth of population, total 
output and per capita output to assess the implications of 
their evolution for economic inequality, international migra-
tion policies, and general economic growth.
In his important book on inequality, Thomas Piketty 
(2014) observes that economic growth “ . . . always includes 
a purely demographic component and a purely economic 
component, and only the latter allows for an improvement in 
the standard of living” (p. 72). Economic growth is measured 
by changes in a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
which can be decomposed into its population and economic 
elements by writing it as population times per capita GDP. 
Expressed as percentage changes, economic growth is equal 
to population growth plus growth in per capita GDP. GDP is 
a measure of economic output and is also an indicator of 
national income which can be defined as total output net of 
capital depreciation plus net income from sources outside the 
country (Piketty, 2014, p. 45). Piketty (2014, p. 73) points to 
evidence that average annual world economic growth 
between 1700 and 2012 was 1.6% made up of equal parts 
population growth and per capita output growth of 0.8% 
each. While these growth rates may appear to be very small, 
they can lead to impressive increases over long periods of 
time. Population growth at an average annual rate of 0.8% 
over the period 1700 to 2015 resulted in a 12-fold increase in 
world population from about 600 million in 1700 to over 7.3 
billion in 2015 (Maddison, 2001 and World Bank, 2017).
Piketty (2014) develops a number of economic relation-
ships to describe the workings of a capitalist economic sys-
tem and traces the implications of these relationships for 
changes in economic inequality. The relationship between 
economic growth and the rate of return to capital is of central 
importance in his analysis. He argues that when the rate of 
return to capital is greater than the economic growth rate (r > 
g in his notation), the likely result will be concentration in 
the ownership of capital leading to increasing inequality. In a 
later article, Piketty (2015) clarifies this result noting that 
other factors as well as economic policies contribute impor-
tantly to the evolution of economic inequality, suggesting 
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that large gaps between r and g will tend to amplify the 
effects of these other factors. This qualification does not 
diminish the importance of economic growth in Piketty’s 
analysis of the causes and consequences of rising inequality. 
He argues that economic growth is likely to be relatively 
slow in the future, less than the rate of return on capital, in 
part because its demographic component is expected to grow 
very little. Baker et al. (2005) agree noting that slowing pop-
ulation growth in the United States is part of the reason that 
future U.S. economic growth will be lower than it was for 
most of the 20th century. Population growth is falling in 
many parts of the world and once the demographic transition 
is completed in sub-Saharan Africa and other areas of robust 
population growth, world population growth will probably 
return to historic levels of less than 1% per year. Average 
annual growth in per capita output has also been fairly mod-
est over the past 200 years accelerating during periods when 
very poor countries begin to catch up with more highly 
developed economies or when rapid productivity growth is 
achieved as was the case in many countries during the 20th 
century. The danger of slow economic growth in Piketty’s 
view is that the resulting concentration of capital will help to 
bring back the patrimonial capitalism of the 19th century 
when one’s fortune was more effectively made by marrying 
an heir to great wealth than by working to develop one’s tal-
ents in the service of a productive career.
Piketty’s explanation of the importance of economic 
growth is not the only possible account, of course. Economic 
growth is important for raising living standards around the 
world and the role of population growth in the evolution of 
living standards is a significant policy issue (see Heady & 
Hodge, 2009). In addition to the potential effects of popula-
tion growth on economic inequality, population and eco-
nomic growth have significant impacts on such controversial 
topics as international migration and global resource use. In 
the following sections of the article, the relationships between 
population and economic growth are analyzed to assess the 
implications of their likely evolution for growing inequality 
around the world and for population and migration policies. 
There is an extensive literature on these relationships but 
little consensus on the actual effects of population on eco-
nomic growth (Heady & Hodge, 2009). Some authors offer 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to show that 
robust population growth enhances economic growth while 
others find evidence to support the opposite conclusion. Still 
others find that the effects vary with the level of a country’s 
development, the source or nature of the population growth, 
or other factors that lead to nonuniform impacts. Heady and 
Hodge (2009) point to wide variation in empirical analyses 
of the link between population growth and growth in per 
capita income due to different methods, control variables, 
and other factors. In the next section, statistical evidence on 
the long-term evolution of population, per capita output, and 
the total economic product for various regions and selected 
countries is laid out. This is followed by a review of the 
theoretical and empirical analyses of the role of population in 
economic growth and a discussion of the impacts of produc-
tivity increases and international migration on economic 
growth. The final section summarizes the evidence on the 
effects of population growth on economic growth and exam-
ines the predictions that long-term economic growth will be 
low as countries around the world complete the demographic 
transition and the potential for high economic growth from 
low-income countries catching up with countries with more 
advanced technological capabilities is exhausted.
Statistical Evidence on the Growth of 
Population, Per Capita Output, and 
GDP
Angus Maddison compiled an extraordinary set of data on 
population, per capita GDP, and GDP for virtually all coun-
tries in the world from 1 to 2008 of the Common Era (World 
Economics, 2016 and Maddison, 2001). After his death in 
2010, researchers at the Groningen Growth and Development 
Center launched an initiative known as the “Maddison Project” 
which seeks to maintain, refine, and update Maddison’s origi-
nal data set (The Maddison Project, 2013). Clearly, there were 
no government agencies collecting data on the national 
accounts of countries that may not even have existed in year 
one of the Common Era, or in 1700 or 1820 for that matter. As 
a result, the estimates recorded in the data sets may be some-
what less reliable than would be the case for more recent sta-
tistics. They are, however, consistent with the historical record 
and calculated in a uniform manner making them reasonable 
estimates of long-term economic trends. The World Bank 
(2017) publishes an online database with a great many socio-
economic variables, including population and real GDP, from 
1960 to the present for most countries and world regions. Both 
statistical sources are used in computing the estimated growth 
rates reported in this article. Data on productivity are from the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2016) and the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD; 2016, 
2017). Population and migration projections are from the U.S. 
Census Bureau (2017). Average annual compound growth 
rates are calculated using the formula: V = Aert where V is the 
final value, A the initial value, r the rate of growth, t the num-
ber of years, and e is the exponential. For example, total world 
population in 1960 was 3.04 billion rising to 7.35 billion in 
2015, a period of 55 years. Setting A at 3.04 billion, V at 7.35 
billion, and t at 55 and solving the formula for r gives an esti-
mate of average annual compound population growth over this 
period of 1.61%. All the GDP estimates reported in this study 
have been adjusted to remove the effects of inflation. Data col-
lected by Maddison (World Economics, 2016) are in 1990 
U.S. dollars while those of the World Bank (2017) are in 2010 
U.S. dollars.
Regional groupings in the following tables reflect the 
classifications used by Maddison and the World Bank. In 
general, high-income countries include the members of the 
Peterson 3
OECD (Europe, North America, Japan, Korea, Australia, 
New Zealand, Israel, and Chile) along with such countries as 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Uruguay, and a number of smaller 
island economies. These countries have annual per capita 
incomes of $12,476 and above according to World Bank 
data. All other countries are considered to be low- and mid-
dle-income countries. Geographic regions vary somewhat 
across the tables according to whether the data are from the 
Maddison project (World Economics, 2016) or the World 
Bank (2017). The Maddison data include one group, the 
“western offshoots” (United States, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand) not found in the World Bank data. The precise 
make-up of geographic regions and other country classifica-
tions used by the World Bank can be found at https://data-
h e l p d e s k . w o r l d b a n k . o r g / k n o w l e d g e b a s e /
articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups
Average annual compound growth rates for population, 
real GDP, and real per capita GDP in various regions and 
countries from 1820 to 2010 are shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
Average annual world population growth over this period 
was about 1% but has varied considerably across regions and 
over time. Europe and the countries formerly included in the 
Soviet Union had relatively slow population growth overall 
with levels that were lower in the 20th century than in the 
19th. One reason for slower population growth in Europe 
was the substantial emigration to Latin America and the 
“western offshoots” where high population growth rates 
were recorded between 1820 and 1913. While European 
population growth rates slowed during the period 1913 to 
2010, they accelerated somewhat in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America. Note that a constant annual population growth rate 
of 1% means that population doubles every 69.3 years. World 
population in 1820 was just over a billion people compared 
with about 6.9 billion in 2010 (World Economics, 2016 and 
World Bank, 2017). The results reported in Table 1 can shed 
light on the timing of the demographic transition in various 
parts of the world. The demographic transition consists of an 
initial phase during which both crude birth and mortality 
rates are high and population growth is slow. As societies 
modernize, mortality rates fall while birth rates remain high 
leading to high population growth rates. Eventually, birth 
rates begin to decline resulting in a return to lower popula-
tion growth as the transition is completed. This process 
appears to have run its course in Europe by the beginning of 
the 20th century and somewhat later in the western offshoots, 
while many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
have yet to complete it.
Average annual growth of per capita GDP also increased 
during the period 1913 to 2010 which, when combined with 
generally higher population growth rates, led to significant 
overall economic growth, over 3% per year for the world as 
a whole. The more recent acceleration of economic growth 
in China and other emerging economies can be seen in 
Tables 3 and 4 covering the period 1960 to 2015. Economic 
growth in the high-income countries of Western Europe and 
North America over this period has been a little less than 
the world average while growth in Asia has been well above 
the global average over the past 55 years. Population 
growth has slowed everywhere except sub-Saharan Africa 
but still accounted for almost half of world economic 
growth over the period 1990-2015. The emerging Asian 
economies are catching up with the high-income countries, 
registering significant growth in per capita GDP with popu-
lation growth contributing relatively little to overall eco-
nomic growth. In China, for example, average annual 
population growth between 1990 and 2015 was only 0.76%, 
perhaps as a result of that country’s former policy of limit-
ing families to one child, while average annual per capita 
GDP growth was 8.72% for an overall economic growth 
rate of 9.48% per year. Similar results are found for India 
Table 1. Average Annual Growth Rates of Population, Per Capita GDP, and GDP, World Regions, 1820 to 1913, 1913 to 2010, and 
1820-2010.
Region
1820-1913 
Population
1820-1913 
per capita 
GDP
1820-1913 
GDP
1913-2010 
Population
1913-2010 
per capita 
GDP
1913-2010 
GDP
1820-2010 
Population
1820-2010 
per capita 
GDP
1820-2010 
GDP
Western Europe 0.73 0.94 1.67 0.47 1.85 2.32 0.60 1.40 2.00
Eastern Europe 0.84 0.60 1.44 0.42 1.79 2.21 0.62 1.21 1.83
Former USSR 1.13 0.49 1.62 0.66 1.70 2.36 0.87 1.11 1.98
Western offshootsa 2.47 1.50 3.97 1.29 1.79 3.08 1.84 1.64 3.48
Latin America 1.43 0.97 2.40 2.05 1.52 3.57 1.75 1.25 3.00
Asia 0.34 0.17 0.51 1.48 2.28 3.76 0.93 1.25 2.18
Africa 0.26 0.67 1.23 2.17 0.83 3.00 1.38 0.75 2.13
World 0.58 0.83 1.41 1.38 1.67 3.05 0.99 1.26 2.25
Source. World Economics (2016) and U.S. Census Bureau (2016) for population; The Maddison Project (2013) for per capita GDP growth; and author’s 
calculations.
Note. The dates 1820, 1913, and 2010 were chosen because there is more complete country and regional information for those dates in the Maddison 
data set. USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
aWestern offshoots are the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
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and Indonesia although population growth in these coun-
tries has been much higher than in China (Table 4).
It is also interesting to note the more recent acceleration 
of per capita economic growth in developing countries. For 
Table 2. Average Annual Growth of Population, Real Per Capita GDP, and Real GDP (Percent), Selected Countries, 1820 to 1913 and 
1913 to 2010.
Country
Population 
1820-1913
Per capita GDP 
1820-1913
GDP  
1820-1913
Population 
1913-2010
Per capita GDP 
1913-2010
GDP  
1913-2010
France 0.30 1.21 1.51 0.47 1.87 2.34
Germany 1.03 1.31 2.34 0.24 1.79 2.03
Italy 0.66 0.45 1.11 0.48 2.15 2.63
Norway 0.99 1.20 2.19 0.71 2.51 3.22
United Kingdom 0.82 0.93 1.75 0.33 1.62 1.95
Former USSRa 1.13 0.77 1.89 1.36 0.47 1.83
Canada 2.43 1.71 4.14 1.51 1.78 3.29
United States 2.45 1.46 3.91 1.19 1.80 2.99
Mexico 0.88 1.09 1.97 2.13 1.54 3.67
Japan 0.55 0.78 1.33 0.94 2.85 3.79
Korea 0.13 0.40 0.53 1.59 3.92 5.51
India 0.40 0.25 0.65 1.44 1.66 3.10
China 0.15 -0.01 0.14 1.15 2.76 3.91
Indonesia 1.14 0.54 1.68 1.59 1.74 3.33
Iran 0.56 0.57 1.13 1.97 1.92 3.89
Jordan 0.51 0.57 1.08 2.98 1.78 4.76
Iraq 0.42 0.57 0.99 2.48 0.49 2.97
Brazil 1.78 0.18 1.96 2.19 2.20 4.39
Argentina 2.86 1.40 4.30 1.74 1.02 2.76
Ghana 0.60 1.34 1.94 2.55 0.93 3.48
Morocco 0.69 0.54 1.23 1.89 1.79 3.68
Egypt 1.14 0.69 1.83 1.97 1.60 3.57
South Africa 1.48 0.82 2.30 2.18 1.19 3.37
World 0.54 0.83 1.37 1.40 1.67 3.07
Source. Author’s calculation based on data from World Economics (2016) and The Maddison Project (2013).
Note. USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
aCountries formerly included in the USSR.
Table 3. Average Annual Growth of Population, Real GDP, and Real Per Capita GDP (Percent), Regions, EU, and United States, 1960 
to 2015, and 1990 to 2015.
Region
Population 
1960-2015
Per capita GDP 
1960-2015
GDP  
1960-2015
Population 
1990-2015
Per capita GDP 
1990-2015
GDP 
1990-2015
World 1.61 1.85 3.46 1.32 1.42 2.74
Low and middle income 1.81 2.77 4.58 1.46 3.04 4.50
High-income countries 0.81 2.28 3.09 0.68 1.37 2.05
East Asia, Pacific 1.49 5.45 6.94 0.95 7.05 8.00
South Asia 2.03 2.97 5.00 1.73 4.25 5.98
Middle East and North Africa 2.48a 1.53a 4.01a 2.03 1.82 3.85
Latin America 1.85 1.79 3.64 1.40 1.53 2.93
Sub-Sahara Africa 2.69 0.78 3.47 2.71 1.10 3.81
North America 1.07 1.99 3.06 1.01 1.38 2.39
EU 0.40 2.26 2.66 0.26 1.38 1.64
United States 1.03 2.01 3.04 0.98 1.40 2.38
Source. Author’s calculations based on data from World Bank (2017).
Note. EU = European Union.
a1970 to 2015.
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the decade of the 1990s, annual growth in per capita output 
in these countries averaged 1.37% compared with a rate of 
4.15% for the period 2000-2015 (Table 5). These results are 
undoubtedly influenced by the exceptional economic perfor-
mance in China and other large emerging economies although 
economic growth also picked up in many low-income coun-
tries. Population growth slowed slightly between these two 
periods in all regions except Sub-Saharan Africa where neg-
ative growth in per capita GDP during the 1990s shifted to a 
much higher rate of 2.29% for the period 2000 to 2015 and 
an overall economic growth rate for this period of almost 
5%. Per capita GDP growth increased substantially in Asia 
and somewhat less in Latin America between these two peri-
ods. The 1990s were a particularly difficult period for Russia 
where population declines and low growth of per capita GDP 
combined to generate negative average annual economic 
growth. Life expectancy at birth in Russia fell from 69.5 
years in 1988 to 64.5 years in 1994 only returning to its pre-
vious high in 2011 after which it seems to have stabilized at 
70.4 years. For comparison, life expectancy at birth in Japan 
in 2015 was 83.6 years and in the United States it was 78.9 
years (World Bank, 2017). Although population continued to 
decline in Russia after 2000, per capita output rebounded 
significantly leading to overall annual average economic 
growth of 3.53%. High-income countries, in contrast, 
registered slower growth after 2000 than in the preceding 
decade. The effects of the Great Recession of 2008-2009 
appear to be reflected in the lower per capita growth rates for 
the period 2000-2015 in the United States, Japan, and most 
European countries (Table 5).
Piketty (2014), Milanovic (2016), and Atkinson (2014), 
among others, have noted that economic inequality declined 
during much of the 20th century only to begin rising after 
1975. In explaining these trends, Piketty (2014) points to the 
30 years after World War II (“les Trente Glorieuses,” p. 11) 
as a period of exceptionally high economic growth. Average 
annual population, GDP, and per capita GDP growth rates are 
shown for selected countries for the period 1945 to 1975 in 
Table 6. World economic growth over this period at 3.79% 
was higher than the average rates for the past 200 years 
(2.25%) or for the period 1913 to 2010 (3.05%). France, 
Spain, Italy, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, 
Mexico, and Brazil were able to realize very rapid growth 
between 1945 and 1975. In the case of France, Italy, the 
Soviet Union, and Japan, much of this growth was driven by 
rebuilding after the destruction of the war years. In many 
Western European countries, population growth rates were 
low but higher growth in per capita output led to substantial 
overall economic growth during this period. These higher 
growth rates meant that Piketty’s inequality, r > g, was 
Table 4. Average Annual Growth of Population, Real Per Capita GDP, Real GDP (Percent), Selected Countries, 1960-2015.
Country
Population 
1960-2015
Per capita GDP 
1960-2015
GDP 
1960-2015
Population 
1990-2015
Per capita GDP 
1990-2015
GDP  
1990-2015
France 0.65 2.10 2.75 0.53 0.95 1.48
Austria 0.37 2.35 2.72 0.44 1.38 1.82
Italy 0.35 2.06 2.41 0.28 0.36 0.64
Norway 0.67 2.46 3.13 0.85 1.59 2.44
United Kingdom 0.39 1.97 2.36 0.52 1.49 2.01
Turkey 1.91 2.43 4.34 1.51 2.30 3.81
Canada 1.27 1.89 3.16 1.02 1.26 2.28
United States 1.03 2.01 3.04 0.98 1.40 2.38
Mexico 2.18 1.72 3.90 1.58 1.10 2.68
Australia 1.53 1.89 3.42 1.33 1.70 3.03
Japan 0.58 3.04 3.62 0.11 0.77 0.88
Korea 1.28 5.68 6.96 0.66 4.18 4.84
India 1.95 3.16 5.11 1.64 4.69 6.33
China 1.31 6.41 7.72 0.76 8.72 9.48
Indonesia 1.96 3.44 5.40 1.40 3.37 4.77
Iran 2.33 1.56 3.89 1.37 1.94 3.31
Brazil 1.91 2.16 4.07 1.29 1.38 2.67
Argentina 1.35 1.32 2.67 1.13 2.68 3.81
Honduras 2.54 1.39 3.93 2.00 1.71 3.71
Algeria 2.32 1.21 3.53 1.71 1.20 2.91
Nigeria 2.53 1.23 3.76 2.58 2.48 5.06
Kenya 3.16 1.36 4.52 2.71 0.80 3.51
South Africa 2.09 0.98 3.07 1.79 0.71 2.50
World 1.61 1.85 3.46 1.32 1.42 2.74
Source. Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2017) data.
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reversed contributing to a reduction of the concentration of 
capital and declining levels of inequality. Piketty (2014) esti-
mates the “pure” rate of return to capital, defined as the 
observed rate of return minus an estimate of the costs of 
managing investment portfolios, to have been 4% to 5% in 
the 19th century declining to 3% to 4% today with substan-
tial variation from country to country. In many of the coun-
tries shown in Table 6, economic growth rates were 
substantially higher than these estimates of the rate of return 
on capital and in several cases, high population growth con-
tributed significantly to overall economic growth.
A striking feature of the estimates in the Tables is that, 
with the exception of the immediate postwar period, eco-
nomic growth in the United States has been slightly more 
rapid than in most Western European countries both in the 
19th and early 20th centuries when it was catching up to the 
more advanced European economies and in more recent 
years. From 1960 to 2015, for example, the U.S. economy 
grew at an annual rate of 3.04% compared with 2.66% for the 
European Union (EU). If the United States and EU are both 
set at 100 in 1960, these growth rates mean that the United 
States would end up in 2015 at 532 compared with 432 for 
the EU, an advantage of about 23%. Note, however, that the 
reason for this difference is not that the United States had 
greater growth in per capita output but rather that U.S. 
population growth was higher. In fact, per capita GDP growth 
in the EU outpaced that of the United States where economic 
growth would have averaged 2.41% instead of 3.04% if the 
U.S. population had increased at the same rate as that of the 
EU. Does this mean that countries with higher population 
growth rates will benefit from greater overall economic 
growth potentially mitigating the effects on inequality that 
concern Piketty? This question is the subject of the next 
section.
The Relationship Between Economic 
Growth and Population Growth
If population growth and per capita GDP growth are com-
pletely independent, higher population growth rates would 
clearly lead to higher economic growth rates. It would still be 
true that, as noted by Piketty (2014), only the growth in per 
capita GDP would give rise to improvements in economic 
well-being. On the other hand, if population growth affects 
per capita output growth, higher population growth rates 
would contribute to either higher or lower overall economic 
growth depending on the nature of its effects on per capita 
GDP. For the world as a whole, over the period 1990 to 2015, 
the correlation between population growth and real per cap-
ita GDP growth, based on World Bank (2017) data, was 
Table 5. Average Annual Percentage Growth of Population, Real Per Capita GDP, and Real GDP (2010 US$), World Regions and 
Selected Countries, 1990 to 2000 and 2000 to 2015.
Region/country
Population 
1990-2000
Per capita GDP 
1990-2000
Real GDP 
1990-2000
Population 
2000-2015
Per capita GDP 
2000-2015
Real GDP 
2000-2015
Low-income 1.64 1.37 3.01 1.34 4.15 5.49
High-income 0.70 1.90 2.67 0.66 0.98 1.64
World 1.46 1.29 2.75 1.22 1.51 2.73
East Asia/Pacific 1.64 1.91 3.55 0.72 3.65 4.37
South Asia 2.02 2.86 4.88 1.53 5.00 6.53
Middle East/North Africa 2.14 1.08 3.22 1.97 2.13 4.10
Latin America 1.65 1.42 3.07 1.23 1.60 2.83
Sub-Sahara Africa 2.72 −0.67 2.05 2.70 2.29 4.99
North America 1.22 2.11 3.33 0.88 0.89 1.77
United States 1.20 2.18 3.38 0.86 0.90 1.76
EU 0.21 2.02 2.23 0.29 0.95 1.24
China 1.11 8.82 9.93 0.55 8.62 9.17
Brazil 1.60 0.95 2.55 1.11 1.64 2.75
India 1.90 3.54 5.44 1.46 5.47 6.93
Russia −0.68 0.28 −0.40 −0.14 3.67 3.53
South Africa 2.29 −0.49 1.80 1.49 1.47 2.96
Japan 0.24 0.88 1.12 0.01 0.71 0.72
Germany 0.37 1.59 1.96 −0.01 1.11 1.10
France 0.33 1.75 2.08 0.63 0.45 1.08
United Kingdom 0.34 2.06 2.40 0.65 1.10 1.75
Norway 0.69 2.87 3.56 0.96 0.63 1.59
South Korea 0.89 5.44 6.33 0.54 3.32 3.86
Source. Author’s calculations using World Bank (2017) data.
Note. EU = European Union.
Peterson 7
–0.1849 suggesting that these two variables were uncorre-
lated during that period. Simple correlation, of course, tells 
us very little about the actual relationship between these vari-
ables. It turns out that economists have developed theoretical 
arguments supporting both the idea that population growth 
slows growth in per capita output and the opposite idea that 
population growth stimulates greater economic growth. 
Thomas Malthus (1993) developed one of the earliest and 
best known theories showing that population growth has a 
negative effect on well-being. He believed that population 
has a tendency to grow more rapidly than food supplies so 
that population reductions through various types of misery 
are always required to keep the number of people at a level 
consistent with the amount of food available. The implica-
tion of Malthus’s model is that average incomes will always 
be driven down by population growth to a level that is just 
adequate for the population’s subsistence.
A major purpose of Malthus’s essay was to argue against 
the English Poor Laws. He suggested that trying to increase 
the well-being of the poor was an exercise in futility as higher 
incomes would lead to population increases that would drive 
incomes back down to the subsistence level. This under-
standing represented an accurate image of the past but missed 
the boat entirely for the future. From 1000 to 1820, average 
annual population growth in England was about 0.29% while 
per capita GDP growth averaged 0.12% for an overall aver-
age annual economic growth rate of 0.41% according to data 
from World Economics (2016). With the Industrial 
Revolution, however, both income and population growth 
began to increase as did the supplies of food. Growth in 
global agricultural output has been faster than world popula-
tion growth over the past two centuries (Peterson, 2009) and 
real per capita GDP in England has increased more than 
11-fold since 1820 (The Maddison Project, 2013). The fact 
that technological innovations have allowed incomes to rise 
well above the subsistence levels familiar to Malthus does 
not mean, however, that the question of how population 
growth affects growth in per capita output is resolved. It is 
still possible that growth in output would have been greater 
if population growth rates had been somewhat lower. In fact, 
population growth in the United Kingdom between 1820 and 
2010 was moderately higher at 0.57% than was the case for 
the previous 820 years while annual growth in per capita 
GDP was substantially more rapid at 1.28% after 1820 
(World Economics, 2016 and The Maddison Project, 2013).
Malthusian perspectives on the effects of population 
growth on social and economic well-being were revived by 
Paul Ehrlich (1968) and others in the latter part of the 20th 
Table 6. Average Annual Growth of Population, Real Per Capita GDP, and Real GDP, Selected Countries, 1945 to 1975.
Country Population growth (%) Real per capita GDP growth (%) Real GDP growth (%)
France 1.02 5.39 6.41
Germany 0.54 3.27 3.81
Hungary 0.51 4.05 4.56
Italy 0.69 5.74 6.43
Norway 0.87 3.75 4.62
Switzerland 1.24 2.66 3.90
Spain 0.94 4.60 5.54
United Kingdom 0.45 1.73 2.18
Former USSR 1.27 3.88 5.15
Canada 2.09 2.32 4.41
United States 1.43 1.10 2.53
Australia 2.08 2.15 4.23
Japan 1.27 7.11 8.38
South Korea 2.26 5.11 7.37
Mexico 3.13 2.94 6.07
Brazil 2.86 3.68 6.54
China 1.81 2.13 3.94
India 1.30 1.00 2.30
Turkey 2.56 4.12 6.68
Egypta 1.85 1.49 3.34
Nigeriaa 2.35 1.81 4.16
South Africaa 2.14 1.74 3.88
Worlda 1.59 2.20 3.79
Source. Author’s calculations based on World Economics (2016), The Maddison Project (2013), and United Nations (2016).
Note. USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
a1950 to 1975.
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century when population growth rates reached very high lev-
els, primarily in low-income countries. The concern of these 
writers was that world population would reach a level that 
would overwhelm the capacity of the earth and its resources 
to generate the food and other goods needed for human life. 
Many felt that both population growth and economic growth 
needed to be scaled back or eliminated entirely to avoid an 
existential crisis. Other authors argued that fears about popu-
lation growth were overblown suggesting that population 
growth would stimulate technological innovations that 
would allow food production to keep up with the growing 
population (Boserup, 1965) or that larger populations would 
result in more brains that could be applied to solving any 
resource problems that might arise (Simon, 1981). In 1980, 
Julian Simon and Ehrlich made a famous bet on the future 
prices of five mineral commodities over the following 10 
years with Ehrlich predicting rising prices as the world popu-
lation exploded while Simon forecast the opposite as clever 
humans found ways to overcome resource constraints. Simon 
won the bet as the commodity prices fell substantially while 
the world added 800 million people to its population (Sabin, 
2014). As population growth rates have begun to fall in 
recent years, the possibility that food and natural resources 
will be exhausted by a larger population seems to be less of a 
preoccupation than the more likely danger that continued use 
of the earth’s resources at current rates will lead to climate 
change and other environmental problems.
The neoclassical growth model pioneered by Solow 
(1956) also provides a theoretical explanation for a negative 
relationship between population growth and growth in per 
capita output. Models of this nature are often referred to as 
“exogenous” growth models because the two variables that 
drive economic growth, savings (which lead to increases in 
the capital stock) and population (which determines the 
amount of labor available), are introduced exogenously. In 
these models, rapid population growth leads to smaller 
amounts of capital per worker slowing economic growth 
(Bucci, 2015). In addition, it is generally assumed that 
increasing population combined with relatively static growth 
in the capital stock gives rise to diminishing returns. Note 
that most theoretical economic growth models do not actu-
ally use population as a factor in economic output. Instead, 
the size of the labor force (number of workers often adjusted 
for the average hours worked by each worker) is the variable 
that is combined with capital to generate GDP. In most cases, 
however, the population growth rate appears to be taken as a 
measure of labor force growth although more sophisticated 
models also take account of labor quality and the structure of 
the labor force. For example, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
(1990) add human capital accumulation which enhances the 
quality of the labor force to Solow’s model and find that 
empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical result 
that higher population growth rates lead to lower steady-state 
economic growth while higher savings rates have the oppo-
site effect.
Early empirical applications of the neoclassical growth 
model found that after accounting for the effects of labor and 
capital in economic growth, there remained a large residual 
thought to be associated with technological progress 
(Shackleton, 2013). Endogenous growth models were devel-
oped to provide a better explanation of this residual by 
including representations of research and development and 
altering some of the assumptions about diminishing returns 
to capital as labor supply increases (Todaro & Smith, 2012). 
An interesting result from early efforts to model endogenous 
growth is that these models often suggest that there is a posi-
tive relationship between population growth and per capita 
economic growth in contrast to the predictions of the neo-
classical growth models. Such an outcome is consistent with 
arguments advanced by Simon (1990) who suggested that 
greater population growth would result in a larger “stock of 
useful knowledge” (p. 168) which would, in turn, foster 
greater per capita economic growth. Jones (1999) identifies 
three types of endogenous growth models noting that early 
versions resulted in the prediction that population growth 
would generate increased per capita GDP growth claiming, 
in contrast to Simon, that this result is at odds with the empir-
ical evidence. The other types of endogenous growth models 
described by Jones also predicted a positive relationship 
between population and per capita economic growth although 
there have been several representations that allow for a nega-
tive correlation between these variables (see Strulik, 2005 
and Prettner & Prskawetz, 2010). Most of these authors 
believe that empirical evidence does not support the idea that 
population growth is positively correlated with per capita 
output growth (Strulik, 2005).
Empirical work on the effects of population growth on 
economic growth in particular countries has generated con-
tradictory results. Sethy and Sahoo (2015) and Tumwebaze 
and Ijjo (2015) find that population growth has a positive 
impact on per capita economic growth in India and the 
Eastern and Southern Africa region. In contrast, Yao, 
Kinugasa, and Hamori (2013) and Banerjee (2012) conclude 
that there is a negative relationship between population and 
per capita GDP growth in China and Australia. Huang and 
Xie (2013) find that current population growth has a negative 
effect on economic growth while lagged population growth 
has a positive effect so that there is no long-term relationship 
between these variables. Such contradictory findings have 
led several analysts to consider the possibility that the impact 
of population growth on per capita output growth may not be 
uniform but, rather, varies with particular circumstances. For 
example, Becker et al. (1999) suggest that population growth 
in low-income, agricultural societies slows growth in per 
capita income due to diminishing returns to the growing 
labor force making more intensive use of a fixed resource 
base while a growing population in high-income, urban 
economies may give rise to greater income growth as a result 
of increasing returns from greater specialization and growth 
in investments in human capital. Bucci (2015) points to 
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positive effects of population growth on productivity due to 
greater specialization but suggests that larger populations 
give rise to more complex production processes that offset 
these effects. Kelley and Schmidt (2001) and Mierau and 
Turnovsky (2014) argue that population growth stemming 
from declining mortality rates stimulates economic growth 
while population growth resulting from fertility increases 
will tend to slow it. The reason for these contrasting effects 
is that declines in mortality provide incentives for people to 
save more which stimulates growth while increases in fertil-
ity have a negative impact on aggregate savings (Mierau & 
Turnovsky, 2014). In a meta-analysis of studies of economic 
growth and population growth, Heady and Hodge (2009) 
found that declining population growth rates in high-income 
countries slow economic growth while high population 
growth rates in low-income countries lower their economic 
growth.
Several analysts have investigated the relationship 
between population and per capita output growth by taking 
advantage of the natural experiment provided by the post-
World War II baby boom in the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and much of Western Europe. Baby booms are 
characterized by relatively short periods of increased fertility 
which can lead to greater population growth. In the United 
States, the U.S. Census Bureau counts the baby boom as last-
ing from July 1, 1946 to July 1, 1964 (Colby & Ortman, 
2014). During this period, the average annual U.S. popula-
tion growth rate was 1.70% which is higher than the average 
of 1.29% for the 20th century as a whole. Per capita GDP 
growth for these years was 1.82%, about the same as the 
average annual growth rate of 1.87% for the period 1946 to 
2010 (The Maddison Project, 2013). Yoo (1994) develops 
three models to examine the impact of this increase in popu-
lation growth on U.S. economic growth. He finds that the 
large increase in the number of children slowed growth as 
resources were transferred from more productive activities to 
education and health care for this large cohort. Once the baby 
boom generation moved from the dependency stage to the 
more productive phase of active workers and savers, stan-
dards of living improved and even when the baby boomers 
exit the labor force, his models suggest that the decline in 
savings will have little impact on economic well-being. 
Bloom and Canning (2004) also show that there are positive 
impacts on economic growth as baby boom cohorts join the 
labor force and save for retirement. Many of these authors 
emphasize the importance of age structure for economic 
development. High population growth rates mean that the 
average age of a population will be young and there will be 
high dependency rates. Forty-three percent of the population 
in sub-Saharan Africa, where population is growing 2.7% 
per year, is under the age of 15 while only 3% is over 65. In 
Japan, where population growth is negative, 13% of the pop-
ulation is under age 15 with 26% over 65 (World Bank, 
2017). As dependents, the large number of children in sub-
Saharan Africa will slow growth but once they enter the 
labor force, these countries can expect to reap a “demo-
graphic dividend” that will enhance economic growth. This 
dividend could be diminished if countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa do not complete the demographic transition to lower 
population growth rates in coming years.
There appears to be some agreement in the literature that 
population growth and growth in per capita output are not 
independent and the most likely nature of the relationship 
between them seems to be that it depends very much on the 
particular circumstances, notably the age structure of the 
population, in the various countries and regions. The aging 
population in countries like Japan means that a relatively 
smaller cohort of working age people will be called upon to 
support growing numbers of retirees slowing economic 
growth unless there is a substantial rise in productivity and 
per capita output. A different type of dependency problem 
exists in many African countries where relatively small 
working-age populations are required to support the very 
large number of children who have important educational 
and health needs. In the future, these children will enter the 
labor force and economic growth should increase. Trajectories 
of population growth do not tend to include large and dra-
matic turning points so it is unlikely that the population 
trends in various parts of the world can be significantly 
altered in the short run by policy changes. As a result, the 
effect of population growth on per capita economic growth 
will probably remain highly country specific although popu-
lation policies may have some longer-term effects on popula-
tion growth and age structure.
Productivity, Migration, and Economic 
Growth
While the effects of population growth on per capita eco-
nomic growth may be quite variable, productivity growth is 
unequivocally related to the “economic component” of 
growth that Piketty points to as the source of improvements 
in the standard of living. As noted earlier, the services of 
capital and labor do not explain economic growth in its 
entirety. The part not explained by these inputs, the “Solow 
residual,” is often referred to as multifactor productivity 
(MFP). It is a measure of the effects of technological change, 
increases in efficiency, and other economic effects that may 
influence output such as increasing returns to scale or 
changes in the allocation of resources (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2016). To measure MFP, it is necessary to deter-
mine the value of total output (GDP) and the contribution of 
the combined inputs, capital and labor, with MFP calculated 
as the amount of output that can be obtained from a unit of 
the combined inputs (OECD, 2016, pp. 101-102). MFP and 
per capita economic growth are distinct concepts but may be 
correlated, in part, perhaps, because the same variable (GDP) 
is in the numerator of both. Piketty (2014) sometimes treats 
per capita economic growth and productivity growth as 
interchangeable. Shackleton (2013) estimates that average 
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annual growth in U.S. MFP over the period 1870 to 2010 was 
between 1.6% and 1.8% which is about the same as average 
annual growth of per capita GDP over that period (1.8%) 
based on the Maddison Project (2013) data. Correlation coef-
ficients for per capita GDP and MFP growth for the period 
1990 to 2014 based on OECD (2017) data for the OECD 
countries for which data are available are shown in Table 7. 
The correlation is quite strong in Germany and Japan but 
there is no apparent correlation in Belgium and Spain. 
Overall, these results suggest that per capita GDP growth is 
not a perfect proxy for MFP growth in these countries in 
recent years.
The evolution of MFP over time follows the business 
cycle closely (OECD, 2016). During the recession of 2008-
2009, both MFP and per capita GDP growth rates were nega-
tive in all but a few OECD countries (OECD, 2017). The 
OECD (2016) suggests that MFP typically increases when 
the economy is expanding but declines when it is contract-
ing. Comin (2006) argues that over the long term, productiv-
ity growth is driven by technological innovation making the 
factors that influence innovation such as patent policies or 
spending on research critically important for economic 
growth in the future. Gordon (2016) argues that economic 
growth between 1870 and 1970 reflected a revolutionary 
change in the way human beings live and work as a result of 
a set of transformative inventions such as electricity genera-
tion and the internal combustion engine. He feels that more 
recent advances in information technology and communica-
tions will not have the same kind of effects as these earlier 
innovations and predicts that future economic growth will be 
lower than it was during the special century of revolutionary 
inventions. Shackleton (2013) is somewhat more optimistic 
noting that the full effects of technological innovations often 
are only seen many years after their introduction so that 
recent advances in information and communications tech-
nologies may yet translate into increased economic growth. 
Although growth in per capita GDP in the high-income coun-
tries did appear to slow down after 2000, it increased in many 
low- and middle-income countries (see Table 5).
There appears to be some agreement among economists 
not only that productivity growth has slowed since 2000 in 
high-income countries but also that there is little prospect for 
a reversal of this trend. Irwin (2016) and Baker et al. (2005) 
point to falling labor forces as the baby boom generation 
retires and workers choose to work fewer hours coupled with 
lower per capita output growth as causes of slower GDP 
growth. Gordon (2016) notes the same types of demographic 
changes as these authors and argues that stagnation in educa-
tional attainment, inequality, and government debt will 
largely offset the effects of any potential technological inno-
vations. He predicts that average annual per capita GDP 
growth in the United States will be only 0.8% over the period 
2015 to 2040, far lower than the average growth rate of 
2.11% (Gordon’s estimate) achieved between 1920 and 
2014. One factor that might help to offset the forces giving 
rise to predictions of slow economic growth is international 
migration. The U.S. Census Bureau (2017) estimates that 
crude birth and mortality rates in the EU are about equal at 
10 per thousand people suggesting that the natural rate of 
population growth is zero. With net migration at two per 
thousand people, the EU did realize a positive population 
growth rate of 0.2%. In contrast, deaths in Japan outnum-
bered births and with virtually no net migration, the country 
had a negative population growth rate of –0.2% in 2016. For 
the United States, the 2016 population growth is estimated at 
0.8% made up of equal parts natural increase (crude birth 
rate of 12 per thousand and crude mortality rate of 8 per 
thousand) and net migration (4 per thousand). The U.S. 
Census Bureau (2017) predicts that natural population 
increases in the United States will continue to decline while 
net migration remains fairly constant. By 2040, the Census 
Bureau estimates that annual population growth will fall to 
0.5% based on a natural increase of 0.1% (crude birth rate of 
11 per thousand and crude mortality rate of 10 per thousand) 
coupled with an increase of 0.4% (four per thousand) due to 
immigration.
In recent years, there has been a fairly steady flow of 
migrants primarily from low- and moderate-income 
Table 7. Real Average Annual Per Capita GDP Growth and 
Correlation Coefficients Between Real Per Capita GDP Growth 
and Multifactor Productivity Growth, Selected OECD Members, 
1990-2015.
Per capita GDP 
growth (%)
Correlation 
coefficient
Australia 1.69 0.5845
Austria 1.37 0.3302
Belgium 1.24 0.1078
Canada 1.27 0.7977
Denmark 1.19 0.7251
Finland 1.20 0.8468
France 1.02 0.7612
Germany 1.34 0.9121
Ireland 4.08 0.7781
Italy 0.38 0.6647
Japan 0.87 0.9190
Korea 4.18 0.6896
Netherlands 1.47 0.7167
New Zealand 1.48 0.5821
Portugal 1.10 0.7604
Spain 1.22 −0.0648
Sweden 1.54 0.8445
Switzerland 0.67 0.8267
United Kingdom 1.45 0.7993
United States 1.41 0.4038
Source. Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2017) data for real 
per capita GDP growth and OECD data at http://www.oecd.org/std/
productivity-stats/ for multifactor productivity growth.
Note. OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development.
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countries to high-income countries as shown in Table 8. In 
2012, about 15 million people emigrated from low- and 
moderate-income countries while high-income countries 
received about an equal number. There is some migration 
among the low- and moderate-income countries but the 
main flows are to Europe and North America as well as 
such regional magnets as South Africa. According to 
United Nations (2017) data, 3.3% of the world population 
lives in countries that are not the countries in which they 
were born (Table 8). Many small island states such as the 
Cayman Islands (39.6% foreign-born) or the Falklands 
(54.1%) have large proportions of foreign-born residents 
as do countries with limited land areas such as Singapore 
(45.4%) and Liechtenstein (61.1%). The Persian Gulf 
states are classified as high-income countries by the World 
Bank and have unusually large foreign-born populations. 
Foreign-born residents make up 51.1% of the population 
of Bahrain, 73.6% of the population of Kuwait, 88.4% in 
the United Arab Emirates, and 32.3% in Saudi Arabia. 
Connor (2016) suggests that economic growth in these 
countries and the availability of short-term work visas 
have attracted large numbers of migrants with the number 
of foreign-born residents growing by 61% between 2005 
and 2015.
Despite the fact that foreign-born residents make up a lit-
tle more than 10% of the populations in all high-income 
countries, the flow of migrants into these countries does not 
appear to be great enough to significantly raise population 
growth rates. Slowing population growth in high-income 
countries not only means lower economic growth rates but 
also an increased burden on the working population to sup-
port the growing numbers of retirees. Immigration increases 
the working age population thereby easing the burden of sup-
porting a large elderly population. In line with some of the 
arguments sketched earlier, higher population growth may be 
beneficial in high-income countries where there is currently 
a tendency for population growth rates to decline. In con-
trast, many populous low-income countries, particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa, would probably be better off with lower 
population growth (Becker et al., 1999). International migra-
tion could play a positive role in adjusting these imbalances. 
In 2016, population growth in Somalia was estimated to be 
2.0% with the high natural rate of increase (2.7%) reduced 
by a net migration rate of seven per thousand (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2017). For all of sub-Saharan Africa, net migration 
had a much smaller impact, reducing the population growth 
rate from its natural level of 2.5% to 2.4% in 2016. Likewise, 
The U.S. Census Bureau (2017) estimated that population 
Table 8. Net Migration (2012) and Foreign-Born Population (Total and Percent, 2015), World Regions and Selected Countries.
Regions/countries
Net migration 
(000) 2012
Total foreign-born 
Population (000), 2015
Foreign-born population as % 
of total population, 2015
World 0.0 243,700.2 3.3
Low- and moderate-income countries −15,350.7 103,218.3 1.7
High-income countries 15,359.6 140,482.0 11.2
East Asia/Pacific −1,457.5 25,565.3 1.1
South Asia −6,280.8 14,103.7 0.8
Middle East/North Africa −213.0 40,278.5 8.4
Latin America −2,081.9 9,234.0 1.5
Sub-Sahara Africa −1,689.0 18,994.0 2.0
North America 6,183.8 54,488.7 15.2
Europe/Central Asia 5,547.4 81,539.4 10.1
China −1,800.0 4,159.4 0.3
India −2,598.2 5,241.0 0.4
Pakistan −1,081.9 3,629.0 1.9
Syria −4,030.0 875.2 4.7
Turkey 2,000.0 2,964.9 3.8
Saudi Arabia 850.0 10,185.9 32.3
Brazil 15.9 713.6 0.3
Russia 1,117.9 11,643.3 8.1
South Africa 600.0 3,142.5 5.8
Japan 350.0 2,043.9 1.6
Germany 1,250.0 12,005.7 14.9
France 331.6 7,784.4 12.1
United Kingdom 900.0 8,543.1 13.2
Norway 235.7 741.8 14.2
United States 5,007.9 46,627.1 14.5
Source. Net Migration from World Bank (2017); foreign-born population, United Nations (2017).
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growth in the least-developed countries in 2016 was only 
reduced from 2.3% to 2.2% by emigration. Hanson and 
McIntosh (2016) argue that there will be little change in the 
impact of emigration from Africa, predicting that it will 
siphon off only a small proportion of the estimated popula-
tion increase between 2010 and 2050.
These observations suggest that there could be benefits in 
both high- and low-income countries of more open borders 
to allow increased migration. Branko Milanovic (2016, p. 
143) argues that realizing the full benefits of globalization 
requires the free movement of goods, services, technology, 
and ideas as well as the exchange of such productive inputs 
as labor and capital. He notes that much progress has been 
made in freeing up the movement of goods, services, and 
capital but the international movement of labor remains 
restricted. The free movement of workers within countries 
has long been one of the strengths of market economies. 
When substantial deposits of petroleum became accessible in 
North Dakota (USA), economic activity picked up greatly 
attracting large numbers of workers from less prosperous 
parts of the United States and easing the labor shortages that 
had arisen with the onset of the oil boom (Healy, 2016). 
Similar benefits to both receiving and sending nations would 
become available if there were fewer barriers to the global 
movement of labor resources. Milanovic (2016, p. 132) notes 
that global inequality is much greater than the inequality 
found within nations due primarily to the large “citizenship 
premium” received by those born in high-income countries. 
He argues that rapid increases in average incomes in poor 
countries combined with greater migration could reduce the 
citizenship premium and the level of global inequality but 
recognizes that allowing greater international migration is 
controversial and likely to be resisted strongly by many in 
high-income countries. Immigration was a prime motivation 
for those in the United Kingdom voting to sever ties with the 
EU as well as a stimulus for the nativist political movements 
that have sprung up in Europe and for the election of Donald 
Trump in the United States.
Conclusion
Most of the work reviewed in this article supports the idea 
that population growth is an important factor in overall 
economic growth and may even contribute to increased 
growth in per capita output in some cases. In low-income 
countries, rapid population growth is likely to be detrimen-
tal in the short and medium term because it leads to large 
numbers of dependent children. In the longer run, there is 
likely to be a demographic dividend in these countries as 
these young people become productive adults. It has also 
been argued that population growth induced by high levels 
of fertility, as is often the case in low-income countries, 
can reduce general well-being in contrast to growth result-
ing from declines in mortality rates generally believed to 
have more benign impacts on savings and economic 
growth. In high-income countries, population growth is 
low and in some cases negative giving rise to age struc-
tures with a high proportion of elderly people in the popu-
lation. The burden of supporting a large number of retired 
people could be eased if population growth were higher in 
these countries but it does not appear likely that fertility 
rates will increase in the future or that mortality rates will 
fall much below current levels. As a result, the natural pop-
ulation growth rate is likely to be very low. The U.S. 
Census Bureau (2017) predicts that annual natural popula-
tion growth in high-income countries will be –0.3% by 
2050. Increased migration from low- to high-income coun-
tries could offset these low and negative natural population 
growth rates while alleviating some of the pressures of 
high population growth in low-income countries. Although 
not directly affected by migration, an additional advantage 
of higher population growth in high-income countries is 
that it reduces the effects of inherited wealth on economic 
inequality (Piketty, 2014, p. 83). Higher population growth 
is generally associated with larger families and large fami-
lies will have to divide inheritances among more children. 
Inherited wealth is an important part of the concentration 
of capital which, Piketty (2014) shows, contributes to 
greater economic inequality.
There are still many who take exception to conclusions 
such as these, arguing that the world is currently overpopu-
lated putting unsustainable strains on resources and the envi-
ronment. The president of “Negative Population Growth, 
Inc.” argues that policies to reduce the world’s population are 
crucial in realizing a human population that can be sustained 
indefinitely (Mann, 2015). Most of those who believe the 
world is overpopulated focus on the potential exhaustion of 
vital resources such as farmland, water, and raw materials. 
The implicit assumption in these analyses is that future tech-
nological innovations will be unable to overcome resource 
scarcities created by the needs of the growing population 
without causing environmental damage. In the case of natu-
ral resources, it is expected that technological innovations 
will be directed toward creating substitutes as the resources 
become scarce and their prices rise. In other words, rising 
prices for petroleum and other natural resources are likely to 
stimulate innovations that will solve many of the problems 
generated by the increasing scarcity that will lead to the ris-
ing prices. In the case of fossil fuels, many would agree that 
increasing the costs associated with their use either as a result 
of scarcities or through taxation or other price-enhancing 
policies would have significant benefits in reducing the 
greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change. 
There may be limits to the ability of market forces and tech-
nology to overcome potential resource constraints or to pro-
tect such environmental goods as clean air and water but it 
would be wrong to think that human ingenuity is completely 
impotent when it comes to creating a sustainable environ-
mental future without severe population reductions. This is 
good as dramatic reductions in the size of the global 
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population are highly unlikely short of widespread nuclear 
conflict or unusually deadly disease outbreaks.
Recent technological innovations in food and agricultural 
production offer an encouraging example. Conservation 
practices such as no-till farming which can reduce soil ero-
sion and chemical runoff, precision farming which allows 
more exact applications of chemical fertilizers and pesticides 
reducing the quantities required, and other environmentally 
benign management practices have been widely adopted 
around the world without significant sacrifices in total food 
production or farm incomes (Derpsch, Friedrich, Kassam, & 
Hongwen, 2010; Thakur, Kassam, Stoop, & Uphoff, 2016; 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2016). Even such widely 
decried technological innovations as those created by genetic 
engineering can give rise to crop varieties that require fewer 
chemical inputs and reduce the impact of agriculture on the 
environment (Hamilton, 2009). It is almost certain that world 
population will reach 10 billion over the next 50 years and as 
these people will have higher incomes on average than is the 
case today, food demand is expected to increase dramati-
cally. Meeting this increased demand without causing irre-
versible damage to the environment may be challenging but 
the rapid adoption of more sustainable agricultural practices 
currently under way suggests that this is not an insurmount-
able task.
Mann (2015) also calls for greater limitations on immi-
gration which is seen as part of the unsustainable population 
growth in high-income countries. The main argument against 
immigration raised in these countries is that immigrants 
accept lower wages than native-born workers who are dis-
placed by the influx of new workers (Frum, 2015). This pop-
ular understanding of the impact of immigration is bolstered 
by academic work done by George Borjas who argues that 
immigration into the United States depresses wages of low-
skilled workers although it does contribute to increases in 
GDP (Borjas, 2013). Other analysts find that immigration 
generally has positive effects on income growth and produc-
tivity with limited displacement of low-skilled workers 
(Boubtane, Coulibaly, & Rault, 2013; Mason 2014; Peri, 
2012). The positive effects of immigration in high-income 
countries are greater if the immigrants are highly-skilled 
(Chojnicki & Ragot, 2016; Kerr, Kerr, Ozden, & Parsons, 
2016) but even immigrants with limited skills are often able 
to make significant economic contributions. The positive 
economic impacts of migration may not be sufficiently com-
pelling to counter the political opposition these human move-
ments engender, however. The arrival of large numbers of 
immigrants can upset traditional social systems leading to 
cultural conflict as well as economic anxieties. While the 
world economy could plausibly benefit from more open bor-
ders, the prevalence of anti-immigration political movements 
in Europe and other high-income countries makes it unlikely 
that the global movement of people will be as free as the 
global movement of goods, services, and capital any time 
soon.
Given the likely evolution of the global population and 
the fairly low expectations that many have for per capita 
growth in output, Piketty’s worry that the rate of return to 
capital will be higher than the economic growth rate leading 
to increasing concentration of wealth and greater inequality 
seems warranted. This problem would be less severe if the 
rate of return to capital were to decline to levels below the 
current 3% to 4% suggested by Piketty. One would expect 
this return to decline as greater amounts of capital are 
amassed which may account in part for Piketty’s estimate 
that current returns are lower than those of the 19th and early 
20th century. Baker et al. (2005) argue that returns to capital 
are related to the state of the economy so that low economic 
growth will lead to lower returns to capital. If this is correct, 
the problem posed by Piketty’s inequality may be at least 
partially self-correcting. In any case, economic growth will 
remain important in the 21st century for at least two reasons. 
First, if Piketty’s analysis is correct, slow economic growth 
may continue to be a factor in rising inequalities in the distri-
bution of income and wealth. Second, economic growth in 
low-income countries is crucial for raising living standards 
and reducing global disparities between the more prosperous 
industrialized countries and those in which poverty and low 
standards of living are still rife (Milanovic, 2016). Because 
population growth plays an important role in overall eco-
nomic growth, the evolution of world population will con-
tinue to be a major global concern.
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